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1. ATTACKS ON THE JUDICIARY

It is increasingly common for jurists, rather than their allegedly
erroneous rulings, to be the target of wrath by disappointed partisans. Within
the last few months, in pleadings and correspondel'r;e, justices on various
Texas appellate courts have been compared to "Pestilence, Death, [and]
Famine," mocked as "bought and paid for employees of the Wall Street rich
... and the country club set," and lambasted for rendering "pro-rapist, pro-biginsurance-defense firm" decisions. l These derogatory taunts by attorneys

• J.D., University of Notre Dame; LL.M .. Yale University; LL.D .• St. Vincent College (Pa).
Professor of Law, St. Mary's University. San Antonio. Texas. Member. American Law Institute.
Commissioner. Federal Judicial Fellows Commission. Fulbright Senior Scholar. People's Republic of
China. 1998. This paper was presented in a preliminary form to the Annual Meeting of the Judicial
Section of the State Bar of Texas in September 1997. Editorial assistance was provided by several law
students: Michael French, Jeffrey Mathews. Jason Kipness. Tamara Pitts, West Winter. Margaret Hopson.
and David Lindeman.
I. Robert Elder, Jr, The Art of the Brief, Disrespectfully Submitted, TEX. LAW .• Aug. II, 1997,
at 2. Elder goes on to say:
Whatever else one can say about them, [attorneys I Robert Halliard, Michael Shore and
Marynell Maloney do possess a certain rhetorical flair:
"Outlined against a hazy July sky. the four horsemen rode again last Wednesday, July 9,
1997. You know them Pestilence, Death, Famine and this Texas Supreme Court: Hilliard
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represent only part of what appears to be a much broader attack on the
independence and integrity of the judiciary.2 There are many examples.
During the most recent presidential election, a decision that evidence in a drug
case was inadmissible led some of the presidential candidates to call for the
resignation of a federal judge in New York, rather than merely for the reversal
of his ruling. 3 Later in the year, in Texas, an expert witness disappointed with
a Houston judge's decision that religious garb could not be worn in a state
courtroom sought to have the judge disciplined by the Commission on Judicial
Conduct rather than have the correctness of the ruling reviewed on appea1. 4
More recently, the Majority Whip of the United States House of
Representatives charged that a San Antonio federal judge should be
impeached for apparently no reason other than that he had granted a
preliminary injunction in a discrimination suit arising from elections in Val
Verde County, a decision with which the Majority Whip disagreed. s Other
federal judges in Tennessee and California have also been targeted for
potential removal because of their alleged "judicial activism."6
These efforts to personalize, rather than professionalize, the process of
judicial criticism suggest the development of an unfortunate trend of abusing
judges for personal or political advantage. In some respects this trend is
similar to the "scorched earth" tactics that became commonplace in the late

wrote in a July 24 motion for rehearing of a Bendectin birth-defect case.
"You are now considered bought and paid for employees of the Wall Street rich, the
insurance conglomerates and the country club set you fawn over," Shore wrote in a letter to the
Supreme Court after reading its opinion in a hospital Iicensing case in which he wasn '1 even
involved. "Defense lawyers I work with are laughing at you. considering you their captive
pets."
"No wonder the court has elected not to publish its opinion in this malter' It must be
embarrassing to take such a decidedly pro-rapist, pro-big-insurance-defense-fmn position with
so appallingly non-existent legal or logic.li Jasis," Maloney wrote 10 a motion for rehearing hl
the 4th Court of Appeals after it had ruled against her client in a nursing home case
These items aren't just inf1ammato1) passages highlighted to make a point-the \\fitings
of all three lawyers are shot through with this type of rancor and passion
fd.; see also "Captive Pets" at Supreme Co urI. TEX. LAW, July 21. 1997, at 2.
2. See N. Lee Cooper, President Ends Term with Call/or ReSistance fa LeRal ServIces CulS and
10 AI/acks on Judiciary, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 4,1997, at CI. CI8 (" 'The biggest challenge to the legal
profession and to the justice system as the new century approaches is the continuing attack upon the
federal judiciary.' "); see also Federal Wril Frees La1>yer, SA~ A~T0:'nO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 4, 1997,
at 28. After a lawyer was sanctioned by the Texas Supreme Court and ordered to pay $1000 to the lawyers
on the other side of a case, he sent a check to the court, which was made "payable to any Texas Supreme
Court Justice." fd. The Supreme Court found the lawyer in contempt. See id. He was arrested, placed
in jail, then later freed by a federal court writ. See id.
3. See Kathy Barrett Carter, Polilicians' Election Year Attacks on Judges Draw Concern/rom
the ABA, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK NJ.), Aug. 5, 1996, at 12, available in 1996 WL 7958618.
4. See Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Banned Yarmulke Leads 10 Judicial Conduct Commission
Complaint, TEX. LAW., Sept. 30,1996, at 5.
5. See Vincent R. Johnson, Judicial Polilics.· Unfair Play, TEX. LAW., Apr. 14, 1997, at 28.
6. See Marcia Coyle, Impeachment a/Judges/or "Activism" Mulled, NAT'L LJ, Mar. 24, 1997,
at A 12; Harvey Berkman, Spiking Judgesfor Rulings, NAT'L LJ, Jun. 30, 1997, at AI
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1980s and early 1990s in certain fields of civillitigation. 7 The trend raises the
prospect of replacing civility and moderation in public discourse with
harshness and excess. These developments also threaten to undermine the
public standing and effectiveness of the judiciary 8
Of course, criticism of the judiciary is not new. One thinks of past
attacks leveled against the lower federal court judges who worked to make the
civil rights movement's promise of racial equality a reality,9 or attacks against
United States Supreme Court justices, such as Chase,1O Taney,11 Warren,12 and
Douglas. l ) But the recent spate of criticism has a harder edge to it, and
surprisingly, it is sometimes more willingly tolerated. For example,
intemperate language that just a few years ago would have caused a court to
reject the filing of a motion may today go unchalienged. 14 Moreover, recusal
motions, which used to be rare, now have become routine. IS At a minimum,
it can safely be said that if ajudge today is subject to harsh attacks for conduct
no more grievous than rendering an incorrect decision, it seems likely that one

7. See generally Thomas M. Reavley. Rambo LlIIgalors Pillmg Aggressive Tactics Against
Legal £Ihies, 17 PEPP. L REV. 637 (1990) (discussing the preference for melodramatic performances by
trial lawyers and the growing intolerance of such techniques).
8. See Jeffrey Rosinek. Polilieal Judge-Bashing Endangers Our System. NAT'L LJ., Aug. 25,
1997, at A18.
9. See, e.g. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY (1978)
(discussing Judge Johnson's role in federal civil rights litigation in Alabama).
10. Justice Samuel Chase was not only widely criticized. but also impeached and tried, though not
convicted. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQl'ESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992), reviewed in Vincent R. Johnson, The
Moderate Rehnquist, 17 YT. L REV 267,268 (1992).
II
See WILLlA\l H. REHNQUIST. THE SUPREME COl.'RT How IT WAS, How IT Is 149 (1987)
12. See BER:-.IARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 124 (J 983)
13. See DA 'vlD M. O·BRIE:-;. STORM CENTER: THE SUPRE\IE COURT IN A\iERlCAN POLITICS 97-99
(1986).
14. See Theodore :v1ack. Court Disrespect 'Jistastejid. TEX. LAW., Aug. 25,1997, at 26, Mack
states that the Texas Supreme Court's "apparent decision to benignly ignore attacks is a fairly recent one"
and notes that, 15 years ago. a motion for rehearing was rejected tor filing because of its intemperate tone.
lei. The more recent motion said that the court's denial of a writ was " 'unprincipled' and that the court
could not maintain its 'intellectual integrity' and allow the decision of the [lower court] to stand." Jd. Of
course, not all courts are inclined to ignore abusive language. See In re Maloney, 949 S.W.2d 385. 386
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997. n." .h.) (stating that an attorney's assertions, in a motion for rehearing and
in response to an order to show cause, were direct attacks on the integrity of the justices of the court and
warranted the forwarding of the matter to the State Bar for disciplinary proceedings). Some bar
associations are redoubling their eflons to defend judges from unfair criticism. See Richard L Fruin, Jr.,
Defending Judicial Independence and Opening Up Courts, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 4, 1997, at C I 0 (discussing
ABA efforts).
15. See John Council. Recusal Roulelle, TEX. LAW., Sept. I, 1997. at 1. Council quotes the
presiding judge for the First Administrative Judicial Region in Dallas, who now hears an estimated 100
recusal hearings a year. as sa) ing: "[W]e didn't use to have this problem 25 years ago.
Most are
absolutely frivolous.
I think it kind of shows the decline in collegiality of the bar and the respect for
judges." Id.
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who engages in ethically questionable conduct will be even more severely
taken to task, producing greater harm to public confidence in the courts.
It has always been important for judges to observe high ethical standards.
But in the combative atmosphere that now prevails, judges at all levels need
to be especially vigilant to avoid ethical improprieties that may unnecessarily
provoke bad publicity.

II.

CANON

5:

REFRAINING FROM INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

For Texas judges, no field of endeavor is more fraught with potential for
an ethical misstep than campaigning for office. The standards differentiating
permissible forms of political activity from those which are forbidden are
finely drawn and not easy to apply to the dynamic process of running a
campaign. In addition, there is relatively little in the way of interpretive
guidance, for precedent constr: 1 ing the pertinent ethics rules is scarce.
Moreover, when mistakes occur, they frequently take place in the public eye.
The starting point for conducting an ethical judicial campaign is Canon
5 of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. Although its various provisions will
be quoted and discussed below, this canon is worth printing in full at the
beginning of this paper, for it is the essential benchmark in this field of
judicial ethics. It provides:
(1) A judge or judicial candidate shall not make statements that indicate
an opinion on any issue that may be subject to judicial interpretation by the
office which is being sought or held, except that discussion of an individual's
judicial philosophy is appropriate if conducted in a manner which does not
suggest to a reasonable person a probable decision on any particular case.
(2) A judge or judicial candidate shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office ~ ~6arding
judicial duties other than the faithful and impartial performance
of the duties of the office, but may state a position regarding the
conduct of administrative duties;
(ii) knowingly or recklessly misrepresent the identity,
qualifications, present position, or other fact concerning the
candidate or an opponent.
(3) A judge or judicial candidate shall not authorize the public use of
his or her name endorsing another candidate for any public office, except that
either may indicate support for a political party. A judge or judicial
candidate may attend political events and express his or her views on
political matters in accord with this Canon and Canon 3 BO 0).16

16.

TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5, reprinted in TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app.

B (Vernon SUpp. 1998).
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Canon 5 applies not only to sitting judges, 17 but also to candidates for the
judiciary.18 A judge who violates Canon 5 or other provisions in the Code of
Judicial Conduct is subject to discipline by the State Commission on Judicial
Conduct. 19 Similarly, a lawyer seeking judicial office may be disciplined by
the State Bar of Texas for failing to comply with the terms of Canon 5 or other
relevant provisions of the judicial code. 20 Among those "other relevant
provisions" are presumably those portions of Canon 2 which state:
A. A judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
B ..... A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the
private interests of the judge or others.'1

These general principles form leitmotifs in the precedent that has emerged
with respect to judicial campaigning.
The obligation of a judge or judicial candidate to follow the law 22
imposes a duty to comply with various statutory provisions bearing upon fund
raising and the like, such as those contained in the Texas Judicial Campaign
Fairness ActY However, an examination of those statutory constraints on
judicial campaigning will be left to another article. The discussion below
focuses on topics falling within the purview of Canon 5 and other provisions
of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. In considering these subjects, it is
useful to bear in mind that case law and advisory opinions have traditionally
held judicial candidates to very high standards of conduct, and they are likely
to continue to do SO.24 Consequently, in charting a campaign, it is wise to err
on the side of caution in deciding what is ethically allowed.

17. Canon 6 of the Texas Code ofJudicial Conduct specifies which judges and justices are subject
some or all of its terms. Jd., Canon 6.
18. Canon 6(G)( I) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct provides: "Any person seeking elective
judicial oflice listed in Canon 6A( I) shall be ><1bjeet to the same standards of Canon 5 that are required
of members of the judiciary" Jd, Canon 6(G)(I)
19. Jd, Canon 6(G)(2)
20
See id. Canon 6(G)(J); see also Rule 802(b) Dr the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct which states: "A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable
provisions of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct." TEX DISCIPLINARY R. l'ROF'L CO."DL'CT 8.02(b),
reprinted In TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp. 1998) (TEX. ST,\ TE BAR R. art.
to

X, ~ 9)

2 J. TEX. CODE JCD. CONDceT, Canon 2.
22. See id, Canon 2(A)
23. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 253.151-.176 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
24. The Advisory Opinions on Judicial Ethics cited and quoted in this article are issued by the
Committee on Judicial Ethics orthe State Bar of Texas. They are published in the Annual Report of the
Texas Judicial System, which can be ordered through the Texas Judicial Council Oflice of Court
Administration in Austin. Advisory Opinions 168-203 are also available on the Internet. See Texas
Electronic Ethics Reporter (last modified Dec. 8, 1997) <http://www.law.uh. edulethics/>.
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At various points, this article argues that, on particular facts, discipline
cannot be imposed on judges or judicial candidates for constitutional or other
reasons. This does not mean that persons involved in judicial races should
engage in those forms of conduct. The interests of society are often best
served by those who conduct themselves in accordance with standards of
behavior far exceeding the lower range of what is protected by the
Constitution.
The analysis which follows occasionally cites decisions from other states
as guidance relevant to judicial campaigns in TexasY It must be remembered,
however, that in the field of electing judges, Texas, in many respects, has
charted an independent course. Not surprisingly, the terms of Canon 5 of the
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct vary considerably from the language of the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Condud 6 and from the
provisions based on that model that are currently in force in many states. 27
Consequently, care must be exercised in relying on out-of-state precedent
dealing with the political activities of judges and judicial candidates. Certain
issues relating to judicial campaigns fall within the ambit of the free-speech
and free-press provisions of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 28 To the extent that out-of-state decisions soundly renect those
constitutional principles, they should, of course, carry significant weight in
Texas.
III. STATEMENTS MADE DURING JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

A. Knowingly False Statements
Judges who are lawyers, as well as lawyers running for judicial office,
are subject to the requirements of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, including the broad pfvvisions of Rule 8.04(a)(3V9 This rule
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."30
In addition, as noted above, Canon 5(2)(ii) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states that "[a] judge or judicial candidate shall not ... knowingly or

25. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing misrepresentations and freedom of
expression).
26. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDL:CT (1990) The legislative history of the 1990 ABA code
is set forth in LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE (1992).
27. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 356 (2d ed. 1995) ("[N]o
Code provision has more variations among the states that have adopted the ... [ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct] than Canon 5.").
28. See id. at 337.
29. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8,04(a)(3)
30. Id.
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recklessly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position, or other
fact concerning the candidate or an opponent.")1
Consequently, if a judge or judicial candidate knowingly makes a false
statement offact, there are at least two potential bases for imposing discipline.
Not surprisingly, there is authority that a former judge cannot imply in
political advertising that he is a current judge.32 So too, a judge who seeks
reelection and is defeated cannot use the words "reelect" or "keep" on
campaign materials used in a subsequent race against an incumbent on another
court. 3 )
In In re Donohoe, the court held that an intentional and deliberate pattern
of making misstatements of fact in connection with a campaign for a position
on a court of appeals warranted censure and that the use of false campaign
materials justified a separate reprimand. 34 In that case, the judicial candidate,
among other things, falsely asserted that the court of appeals had never
reversed a trial judge if the appellant was represented by a woman. J5 In fact,
the candidate herself had obtained a reversal from a panel on which the judge
she was challenging sat. 36 The candidate also published, as part of her
campaign materials, a letter written by a fellow attorney, which the candidate
had materially altered by removing the essence of three paragraphs.37 In
affirming the imposition of discipline, the court reasoned:
We are dealing with a delicate balancing of rights involving the public,
the incumbent judge, and the lawyer candidate for judicial office. On the one
hand the courts, as an institution, are entitled to the respect due to the office
because the acceptance of judicial decisions ultimately depends upon the
citizens' belief in the integrity and impartiality of the courts. On the other
hand, the members of the judiciary are subject to legitimate and accurate
criticism and evaluation. A candidate for judicial office has a right to
challenge an incumbent judge's ability, deciSions andjudicial conduct, but
it must be done fairly, accurately and upon facts, not false representations.

31. TEX. CODE Juo. CO;;OuCT, Canon 5(2)(ii).
32. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex .. Op. 193 (1996). reprinted in 68 TEX. JUD.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. AO.Y1IN. TEX. Juo. SYS. ANN. REp. 70 (1996) (stating that Canon 5(2)(ii) would be
violated if a former Justice of the Peace implied in political advertising that he was a current Justice of the
Peace); Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op. 195 (1996) reprinted in 68 TEX. JUD. COUNCIL &
OFF CT, ADMIN. TEX, JUD. SYS, Al'.'N, REp. 71 (1996) (stating that an individual who has resigned from
a County Court at Law bench to run for a District Court bench and who is currently practicing law cannot
use the title "Judge" in political advertisements or use election materials from previous campaigns for
county bench races that say only "Vote for Judge _ _ " because such conduct would violate Canon
5(2)(ii)).
33. See Comm, on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 135 (1990) reprinted in 62 TEX. JUD.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. Sys. ANN. REp, 125 (1990).
34. 580 P.2d 1093, 1098-99 (Wash. J 978).
35. See id. at 1095.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 1098.
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The voters are entitled to a fair statement and evaluation of the qualifications
of the candidates.
By the attorneys' oath, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Professional Responsibility the candidates must maintain the respect due the
courts of justice. Judges should not be subjected to false allegations about
particular decisions. A judge's ability to render a reasoned decision should
not be clouded by the fear that a challenger can twist words or allege
distorted facts in an election campaign.
We agree that a person does not surrender freedom of expression rights
when becoming a licensed attorney .... However, we do not believe that the
First Amendment protects one who utters a statement with knowledge of its
falsity, even in the context of a judicial campaign 38

A judge or judicial candidate cannot circumvent the rule against
communication of a known falsehood by acting through the agency of a third
person. 39 Rule 8.04(a)(1) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct expressly states that "[aJ lawyer shall not ... violate these rules
(including Rule 8.04(a)(3), the rule against dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation], knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another."40 Thus, a judge or judicial candidate may be held
liable for knowingly false statements disseminated by a political committee,
provided the involvement of the judge or candidate in the committee's
misconduct is adequately established. 41
Under general tort principles, an ambiguous statement can support an
action for deceit. 42 If the statement's false meaning is accepted by the listener
and known to the maker of the statement, and if the maker intends to convey
the false meaning or is indifferent as to how the statement '.vill be und\;;l.;tood,
an action willlie. 43 Similar principles apply to statements made in the course
of ajudicial campaign. Thus, a candidate for judicial office is not permitted
to say that an opponent was "removed" from office when, in fact, the opponent
had not been expelled for misconduct but merely defeated for reelection. 44

38. Id. at 1097 (citation omitted) (emphasis added)
39. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.04(a)( 1).
40. Id
41. Cf In re Beatty, 517 N.E.2d 1065, 1069-70 (ilL 1987) (holding that a complaint charging
attorneys with having violated disciplinary rules through the conduct of a political committee, which
allegedly had distributed false statements concerning incumbent judicial candidates, failed to allege
sufficient allegations of fact to state a disciplinary cause of action).
42. See RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS ~ 527 (1977)
43. See id.
44. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op. 169 (1994), reprinted in 66 TEX. JUD.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. SyS A'IN. REp. 125-26 (1994).
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Recent Supreme Court decisions make clear that the United States
Constitution provides no blanket protection for expressions of opinion. 45 If
a statement in the form of an opinion (e.g., "In my opinion. the incumbent
judge has swindled the public") carries with it a false implicit statement offact
(i.e., that t'le judge has committed particular acts of dishonesty), it may serve
as the predicate for imposition of legal sanctions. 4b These rules are now well
established in the tort fields of defamation and misrepresentation. l " and it
should be assumed that the same analysis will be followed in the imposition
of professional discipline.
It may be difficult to detemline \vhether a statement of opinion implicitly
asserts false facts. Courts regularly struggle with that question and have
developed various tests as aids to the analYSIS of particular situations. Courts
typically consider the "general tenor" of the statement. the setting in \Vh ich it
was made, and whether the speaker used precise or imprecise language.'18 If
the listener is unacquainted with the factual context about which the statement
is made, a court will be more willing to find that the statement carries an
implicit assertion of fact than if the recipient is already fully familiar with the
relevant data. 49 Likewise, a statement which is made under circumstances in
which the listener should anticipate the use of fiery or exaggerated rhetoric
will less likely be termed a statement of fact.'\! Ordinari ly, statements are not

45. See, e.g, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co, 497 U.S. 1,5,17 (1990) (holding that there is no
constitutionally based "wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion,' "
and that a statement of opinion which implies a false assertion of fact may be defamatory in the case of
a sports commentator who wrote in a newspaper column that two school of1icials testifying at an athletic
sanctioning board had lied)
46. See id. at 20.
47. See, e.g, RESTATE\lENT (Second) OF TORTS ~ 539 (1977) Section 539 provides
(I) A statement of opinion as to facts not disciclscd and not otherwise known to the
recipient may, if it is reasonable to do so, be interpreted b) him as an implied ,tatement
(a) that the facts known to the maker are nut incompatible with his opinion: or
(b) that he knows facts suf1lcient to justify him in t,-,~r';~g it.
(2) In detenmining whether a statement of opinion may reasonably be so interpreted, the
recipient's belief as to ,\hether the maker: as an ad\ erse interest is important
Jd.
48. See 600 \Vest I I 5th SI. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 934·38 (~y 1992)
(concluding that statements that a proposed restaurant "cknigrated" the building, tim a lease and
'proposition" were fraudulent and "smelled of bribery and corruption," and that the lease "as "illegal"
could not constitutionally be the subject of a defamation action because none of the statements impl ied
knowledge of a specific criminal transaction, the statements used tigurative language, they were in some
respects obviously exaggerated, and they were made at a heated public hearing).
49, See, e.g., Pritsker v Brudnoy, 452 N.E.2d 227 (\13SS 1983) In ?rilsker, a restaurant critic
stated on a radio station program that the owners of a dining establishment were "unconscionably rude and
vulgar, , ,PIGS." Jd. at 228. In holding that the critic's opinion did not carry with it an implicit statement
offac!, the court found it important that the restaurant was open to the public and there was no suggestion
that other individuals could not visit the establishment and draw their own conclusions. See id. at 229·31.
If, in contrast, the speaker had stated or implied that the statement was based on information that was
otherwise unavailable to the recipients of the communication, a ditTerent result might have followed.
50. See Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co., 497 US 1. 17 ( 1990) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v,
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actionable if they lack specificity, or merely indicate that the speaker thinks
ill of another. In the end, however, the issue of whether an expression of
opinion carries with it a false statement of fact is, by itself, merely a ldctual
question for the fact finder to resolve. A judge or judicial candidate who
utters unfavorable opinions about an opponent runs the risk that that question
will be decided in a way that permits the imposition of discipline under the
usual rules governing the dissemination of false information.

B. False Statements Recklessly, Negligently, or Innocent!."¥' ,Hade
Knowingly false utterances must be distinguished from other false
statements which are not known to be untrue, but are uttered as a result of lack
of care (negligently or recklessly) or perhaps even innocently. It seems
doubtful that a lawyer will be subject to discipline for making an innocent or
even negligent misrepresentation, for courts have routinely refused to so
hold. 51 If, however, a high degree offault is shown (i.e., recklessness as to the

Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); Letter Carriers v. Austin. 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974); Greenbelt Coop.
Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler. 398 U.S. 6,13-14 (1970»
51. See, e.g, State Bar v. Lerner, 859 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [I st Dist.j1993, no writ).
Rule 8.04(a)(3) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct provides. as noted above, that "a
lawyer shall not.. engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud. deceit or misrepresentation." TEX.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.04(a)(3). Decisions interpreting this language have routinely
required proof of intentional deception; a finding of innocent misrepresenratJOn. or even negligent conduct,
will not support the conclusion that the rule has been violated. See, e.g, Lerner. 859 S W.2d at 499-500.
In Lerner, an attorney's misr a 'dling of a settlement check led to charges by the State Bar that she
had violated the fraud rule. TEX. Sr"TE BAR R. art. XII. § 8, DR 1-102(A)(4) (Tcx Code Profl Resp.),
34 TEX. BJ. 758 (1971. superseded 1990), the predecessor of Rule 8.04(a)(3). \\hich contained identical
language, and the rule against conduct adversely reflecting on an attorney's iltness to practice law, TEX.
STATE BAR R., art XII, Ii 8, DR 1-102(A)(6) (TEX CODE PF0F'L RESP), 34 TEX. BJ. 758 (1971,
superseded 1990). See id. at 499-500. Although the appellate court found that Lerner did "not contest the
trial judge's finding[] that she ... [had] misled [opposing counsel] into believing that the . . lawsuit had
been settled: the court affirmed the trial judge's determination that there \\ as no violation of the fraud
rule. Id. The appellate court wrote:
The trial judge obviously believed that Lerner's conduct was wrong. but not that Lerner
acted dishonestly, fraudulently, or deceitfully, as required by DR I-I 02(A)( 4) Such findings
would obviously reqUire Intentional misconduct, but Lerner's July 14 letter informed [opposite
counsel] of all the pertinent facts surrounding her handling of the money and her refusal to
return the senlement documents. The trial judge could have concluded that this disclosure by
Lerner was inconsistent with the State Bar's allegations of intentional dishonesty done to
defraud, deceive, or mislead.
The allegations that Lerner's conduct adversely reflects upon her fitness to practice law,
DR 1-102(A)(6), are judged by a different standard. For that conduct, intent is not essentiaL
Negligent conduct alone may adversely reflect upon an attorney's fitness to practice law. Thus,
lack of dishonest intent would not necessarily exonerate Lerner from liability for violating DR
1-102(A)(6) .
Id. at 499-500 (emphasis added). The above excerpt makes plain that intentional dishonesty is an essential
element ofa violation of TEX. STATE BAR R, art. XII. § 8, DR 1- I 02(A)(4) (Tex Code Profl Resp.), 34
TEX. BJ. 758 (1971, superseded 1990), and its identical successor, TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULE PROF'L
CONDUCT 8.04(a)(3)
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falsity of the statement), a different outcome may result.
There is language in Texas ethics codes which suggests that, for purposes
of discipline, a line is to be drawn between negligence on the one hand and
recklessness on the other, so that publication of a negligently false statement
is an insufficient predicate for discipline. whereas recklessness as to falsity
warrants condemnation. For example, Canon 5(2)(ii) of the Texas Code of
Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge or judicial candidate shall not ...
knowingly or reckless!.v misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present
position, or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent."':
In condemning only knowing or reckless misrepresentation, this
language suggests that merely negligent falsity cannot be punished as an
ethical infraction. Expressio unius est e:rciusio alterius. 53 The same innuendo
flows from the language of Rule 8.02(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, \vhich states:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or fa/sit. concerning the qualifications or
integrity of a judge, adjudicatory official or public legal officer, or of a
candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office. q

In distinguishing between recklessness and negligence, the drafting of
Canon 5(2)(ii) and Rule 8.02(a) appears to reflect the constitutional precedent
which has evolved in the field of defamation. Beginning with New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States has
consistently held that public officials (such as judges) and public figures (such
as candidates for judicial office) cannot prevail in an action for libel or slander
without proving "actual malice," meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. 55 "Actual malice" must be established in a defamation

52. TEX. CODE JUD. CO:\DL'CT, Canon 5(2)(ii)
53. "[T]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581
(6th ed. 1990)
54. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.02(a).
55. 376 U.S. 254, 284-91 (1964) "Actual malice." a.s defined in ,Yew York Times and subsequent
cases, is a legal tenn ofan which must be clearly distinguished from "express" or "common law" malice.
See id. One may utter true statements. just as easily as those which are false, with spite, ill will,
vindictiveness or motives of revenge-that is to say, with express or common law malice. A showing that
the defendant was actuated by bad motives is not, by Itself. sulTicient to satisfy the actual malice
requirement. See id. Proof of ill will says nothing about whether the defendant knew of. or acted
recklessly as to, the falsity of the defamatory statement
Jury instructions pennitting a finding of actual malice merely upon proof of hatred, enmity, desire
to injure, or the like, are constitutionally defective See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S.
81,82 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.s 75, 84 (1966); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 342 (2d
Cir. 1969); Hinnan v. Rogers, 257 KW.2d 563, 566-67 (Minn. 1977); Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 196 N.W.2d
685,691 (Wis. 1972). In discussing the reasoning underlying this position, the Supreme Court observed
in a criminal defamation case:
[TJhe great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area
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action by clear and convincing evidence,56 and it is a highly subjective
standard:
[The] cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a
reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated
before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in faci enterlained seriOliS doubts as (0 Ihe
truth ofhis publicalion 57
The rule on actual malice reflects "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp atldcks on government and public officials."58 This
"profound national commitment" is as relevant to judicial elections as it is to
other areas of politics. It would therefore be surprising if the constitutional
principles which the courts have recognized in the field of defamation did not
have relevance to the imposition of discipline based on statements uttered by
judicial candidates and judges in the course of a campaign.
It makes a great difference for disciplinary purposes whether, with
respect to false statements, recklessness and negligence are lumped together
or are distinguished from one another. In the former case, a judge or judicial
candidate could be disciplined merely because the falsity could have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable care. In the latter case, the fact

preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the kno\\ ing or reckless falsehood.
Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be
proved in court that he spoke out of hatred: even if he did speak out (If hatred. utterances
honestly bdiC\ed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.
permitting a finding of [actual] malice based on an intent merely to inflict
Under a rule.
harm. rather than to inflict ham] through falsehood. "it becomes a hazardous matter to speak
out against a popular politician. with the result that the dishonest and incompetent will be
shielded." Moreover. "[i]n the case of charges against a popular political figure ... it may be
almost impossible to show freedom from ill-will or selfish political motives."
[O]nl: those false statements made with the high degree of ;J\,areness of their
probable falsity demanded by Sew York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal
sanctions.
[The Constitution protects even] "vehement. caustic. and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public oflkials ,.
Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U.S 64.73-75 (1964) (citations omitted) (quoting Dix W. Noel, DefamatIOn
of Public Officers and Calld/dales. 49 COLL'!. L REV 875.893 (1949). Sew York Times Co, 376 U.S.
at 270).
Of course. in many instances. evidence of express malice may be coupled with facts showing that
the defendant lacked an honest belief in the truth of the statements. In those cases, proof of malice in the
New York Times sense allows the action to go forward: proof of common-law malice may encourage the
jury to award a large verdict.
56. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968)
57. fd. at 731 (emphasis added)
58. Sew York Times Co. 376 US. at 270. The Supreme Court has reasoned that "[the] .
erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and. must be protected if the freedoms of expression
to survive.'" !d. at 271-72.
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need
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that the speaker could or should have known of the error is not enough to
support the imposition of sanctions.
Is a judge or judicial candidate required to conduct a thorough
investigation into the facts before saying anything that adversely reflects upon
an opponent? Such diligence is undoubtedly desirable, for it tends to
minimize erroneous statements, elevate the tone of public debate, and inspire
confidence in the electoral process. However, as a matter of constitutional
law, a judge or judicial candidate probably is not bound to make such an
inquiry. The precedent vvhich has emerged in the field of news reporting is
instructive. In disputes raising the issue of whether members of the media
acted with actual malice (i.e., at least recklessness) in publishing false
statements, the courts have held that ordinarily the defendant is under no
obligation to talk to the subject of the defamatory communication to obtain
that person's version of the events described 59 or to endeavor to present an
objective picture. ao Moreover, factual inaccuracies alone do not suffice to
prove actual malice,61 nor is recklessness established merely by showing that
the reporting in question was speculati\e or even sloppy.6e Indeed, "a public
figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from professional
standards and ... a newspaper's motive in publishing a story-whether to
promote an opponent's candidacy or to increase its circulation-cannot
provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice."6J Even the deliberate
alteration of quotations will not prove that the publisher acted with knowledge
of falsity, unless the alteration materially changes the meaning of the
quotation alleged to be defamatory.64
Of course, claiming a constitutional right is one thing and proving a
violation is another. A judge or judicial candidate who is charged with
misconduct may find the fact-finding process highly invasive. In defamation
cases, the publisher's state of mind must normally be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. 65 Consequently, in Ill-:dia libel cases, plaintiffs
routinely seek discovery of information about such matters as
communications between reporters and editors, facts known but not used in
a story, the pressures under which the work was prepared, and the identity and
credibility of the defendant's sources. 66 Presumably, a similar course could

59.
See. e.g, Rosenbloom v Metromedia. Inc. 403 U.S. 29. 56-57 (1971).
60. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567. 576 (5th Cif. 1966).
61. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 40 I U.S 279, 292 (1971); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.,
557 F.2d 107. 109 (7th Cif. 1977)
62. See Oliver v. Village Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.DNY 1976).
63. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657. 665 (1989).
64. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S 496. 517 (1991).
65. Cj Vincent Robert Johnson, Defamation (Libel and Slander) § 1.02[3][1], in PERSONAL
INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES (1986) (discussing circumstantial evidence of the editorial
process).
66. Cj Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (stating that the First Amendment does not ban
plaintiffs from inquiring into editorial processes and states of mind of those responsible for publication);
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be followed by disciplinary authorities if the applicable standard for discipline
is modeled on the constitutional principles which have emerged in defamation
cases.
A prudent candidate in a judicial campaign will stay clear of the line
distinguishing the impermissible from the protected. Nevertheless, it is
important to know where the line will be drawn. Although there are some
occasional expressions suggesting that negligent misrepresentation will
support the imposition of discipline,67 it is likely that the constitutional
principles governing libel and slander actions by public officials and public
figures will continue to set the standard for whether a judge or judicial
candidate can be disciplined for misrepresenting the identity, qualifications.
present position, or other facts concerning an opponent. 68

C. Negative Campaigning that Impugns the Integrity oj the Judicial S,vstem
Can the angry temper or negative tone of campaign statements by itself
warrant discipline? If a statement is not provably false, can it be challenged
on the ground that it is unduly vitriolic or contentious? Put differently, are
judges and judicial candidates obliged to observe an elevated tone of debate
in the pursuit of an electoral victory? Many writers and courts have suggested
or taken this approach.69 Thus, the American Bar Association's Code of

St. Amant. 390 U.S. at 727 (]968) (opining that a statement based wholly on "an unverified anonymous

telephone call" might be actionable under the actual mal ice standard).
67. See State v. Russell. 610 P.2d 1122 (Kan. 1980) The Kansas Supreme Court stated that
"[wJhen derogatory factual allegations are false and with ordinary care should have been known to be false.
discipline may be imposed." Id. at 1127. However, this endorsement ofa negligence standard was dicta.
for the court expressly found that the respondent attorne, was "guilty of intentionally puhl ishing known
falsehoods." 1d. at 1128. Moreover, the l ' r: did not address whether :,pniigence should be distinguished
from recklessness, and at least one of the cases cited by the court for support, State Board of Exam. v
Spriggs, 155 P2d 285 (Wyo. 1945). predated tk United States Supreme Court's constitutional ization of
the law of defamation and articulation ofan actual malice standard for public olTicials and public figures.
See Russell, 610 P2d at 1128
68. The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct expressly notes that Its provisions are 'rules of reason,
which should be applied corwstent with constitutional reqUirements." TEX. CODE JCD. CO>"DCCT, Canon
8(A)

69. See. e.g., In re Donohoe, 580 P2d 1093 (Wash 1978). The \Vashington Supreme Court
concluded that, '[ilf running for judicial olTice, a lawyer may criticize an incumbent judge who is his
opponent but the criticism must be well founded, on a high plane, factual, and not personal." Jd. at 1097
(citing R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 21 (1966). In the same vein, the old Texas Code of Professional
Responsibility, which was superseded by the current Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
on January 1, 1990, see TEX. STATE BARR., art. XII, § 8 (Tex. Code Profl Resp.), 34 TEX. BJ. 758 (1971,
superseded 1990), articulated a similar aspirational goal for lawyer criticism of judicial candidates. Also,
Ethical Consideration 8-6 provided in relevant part:
Judges and administrative officials having adjudicatory powers ought to be persons of integrity,
competence, and suitable temperament. Generally, lawyers are qualified, by personal
observation or investigation, to evaluate the qualifications of persons seeking or being
considered for such public offices. and for this reason they have a special responsibility to aid
in the selection of only those who are qualified. .
While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to
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Judicial Conduct cautions in mandatory terms that "a candidate for a judicial
office: ... shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office. "70 In a
recent case, which is illustrative, the New York Commission on Judicial
Conduct wrote in imposing discipline:
Even in his or her own campaign, a judge faces constraints. A judicial
candidate must "maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office" ....
Even in the face of provocation by an opponent, a judge must adhere to this
standard. Respondent's political advertisements, suggesting that his opponent
would be biased as a judge and was not respected in his profession and
comparing him to comic characters. lacked the dignity required of judicial
candidates. 71

It is easy to posit examples of negative campaigning. Consider, for
instance, whether it would be permissible for a judicial candidate for the
Texas Supreme Court to make statements like those quoted at the beginning
of this article, painting the incumbents as the judicial equivalent of pestilence,
death, and famine or as "captive pets" of the insurance industry7" Or take the
recent case where a judicial candidate labeled the incumbent a "judicial
reactionary" and accused him of having a " 'campaign treasury heavily laden
with lavish contributions by politically influential lawyers and lobbyists,
power brokers for liability risk insurance companies, finances, environmental
polluters and a heavy handed law enforcement establishment of this
community.' ,,73 Of course, harsh statements make for easy cases. But there
are also mild forms of negative campaigning, such as those contained in a
recent fund-raising letter which said only that the candidate was running "to
restore fairness, respect and experience" to the bench and urged voters to "give
justice a chance.,,74 Even if such statements can be labeled "negative," how
they should be dealt with as a matter of judicial ethics is far from clear.

criticize such otTicials publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use
appropriate language, and avoid petty criticism, for unrestrained and intemperate statements
tend to lessen public confidence in our legal svstem. Criticisms motivated by reasons other
than a desire to improve the legal system are not justified.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-6 (1980)
70. MODEL CODE OF Jl'DIClAL CONDl'CT Canon 5(A)(3)(a) (1990). rhe Texas Code of Judicial
Conduct contains no parallel language.
71. N.Y. COM. JLD. CO~D., Jan. 27, 1994. avaIlable in 1994 WL 897478
72. See Elder, supra note I, at 2.
73. in re Hopewell. 507 N.W.2d 911,913-14 (SO 1993). The court suspended the attorneycandidate from practice based in part on its finding that the quoted statements violated provisions of the
state code of judicial conduct requiring a judge or judicial candidate to promote confidence in the
judiciary. See id. at 914-15,918. The court noted, however, that the attorney had abandoned his initial
plan to defend his conduct on the ground that it was protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech and that, therefore, the court did not address that issue. See id. at 917 n.ll.
74. This language appeared in a fund-raising letter used in San Antonio in fall of 1997. A copy
is on file with the author of this article.
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The most relevant provision in the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
would appear to be Canon 2(A): "A judge shall comply with the law and
should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."75
Although the text of Canon 2(A) imposes this obligation of promoting
public confidence only on judges, the same requirements are made applicable
by other provisions of the code to "[a]ny person seeking elective judicial
office."76 It might reasonably be argued that negative campaigning by a judge
or judicial candidate diminishes "public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary" and, therefore, such statements run afoul of
Canon 2(A).
However. it is open to question whether a rule that judicial campaign
speech must promote public confidence in the judiciary could survive
constitutional scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court has never directly
ruled on the issue.
In the field of lawyer advertising, disciplinary authorities at one time
insisted that communications by lawyers about their availability or services
had to be restrained and dignified. 77 It is now clear that the constitutionality
of restrictions on commercial speech by attorneys turns not on whether the ad
is tasteful, but whether it is false or misleading. Thus, in Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, the Supreme Court rejected a rule which, for the
purpose of ensuring that attorneys advertised "in a dignified manner,"
restricted the use of illustrations. 78 The Court wrote:
[W]e are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity
in their communications with the public is an interest substantial enough to
justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights. Even if that were the
case, we are unpersuaded that undignified behavior would tend to recur so
often as to warrant a prophylactic rule .... [T]he mere possibility that some
members of the population might find advertising embarrassing or offensive
cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that
some members of the bar might find beneath their dignity.7"
At least one other court has taken a similar approach in a case involving an
attorney's campaign for a non-judicial office. In Slate v. Russell, the court
observed that publishing statements which do not appear to be in good taste
and which are largely political rhetoric cannot be the basis for imposing

75.

TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT. Canon 2(A)

76.

Jd. Canon 6(G)(l).
See Vincent R. Johnson. Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and

77.
Associates.' Tori, Fiduciary, and DiSCiplinary Liability. 50 U. PITT. L REV 1,23-25 (1988) (discussing
the rules once applicable to the announcement of a lawyer's move from one firm to another).
78. 471 U.S 626,648 (1985)
79.

Jd
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discipline against an attorney.80
Howeyer, other courts have focused on the impact that judicial campaign
language has on the administration of justice. They have reasoned, in effect,
that lawyers and judges have special obligations because of their professional
status, and that important state interests justify according them a dim inished
scope for free expression,81 even in the context of a political race. For
example, in In re Riley, the Supreme Court of Arizona wrote in J 984:
Even if not a candidate for judicial office, a lawyer is held to a narrower
standard of free speech than a non-lawyer when discussing the judiciary:
A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech or
political activities until he runs afoul of the penalties of libel or
slander, or into some infraction of our statutory law. A member
of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the point where he infringes
our Canon of Ethics; and if he wishes to remain a member of the
bar he will conduct himself in accordance therewith.
A lawyer may be disciplined if his public comments threaten a significant
state interest. The good standing of the judicial system is such a significant
interest. Generally, and also during a judicial campaign, a lawyer may
accurately critici:::e a sitting judge, but may not impugn the integrity of the
judicial system or question the decisions of the judge. 82

Elaborating on this view, the court stated:
Freedom of speech does allow fair comment even by a lawyer
candidate concerning a judge opponent:
A candidate for non judicial office is free to announce his stand
on the issues he must pass upon in office, and to pledge his vote
on those issues; the judicial candidate is forbidden to enter this
customary campaign arena. Hence, un less the election is to be a
pure popularity contest based on name recogr.ition alone, the only
legitimate area for debate is the relative quai"ications of the
candidates. In our view, the health, work habits, experience and
ability of the candidates are all matters of legitimate concern to
the electorate who must make the chole'e.
We believe Ihat candidates for judicial ojJice her"e a First Amendmel1l
right to critici:::e an incumbent judge for such mailers as intemperate

80. 610 P.2d 1122. 1127 (Kan. 1980).
81. See In re Schenk, 870 P.2d 185,203-05 (Or. 1994). In Schenk, ajudge wrote a letter to the
local paper and a "guest editorial" which criticized the district attorney for actions in a case that was tried
before the judge. See id. at 200. In suspending the judge for 45 days without pay, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that the judge's comments did not preserve or promote public confidence in the judiciary or
in its impartiality and that those interests outweighed the judge's interests in speaking out on a matter of
public concern. See id. at 204-05.
82. 691 P.2d 695.703 (Ariz. 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Woodward,
300 S.w.2d 385, 393-94 (Mo 1957))
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behavior, injudicious actions, lack ofjudicial temperament, unpredictability,
and unnecessary delay in rendering decisions. We are aware that the line
between fair comment and impemlissible comment is indistinct and also that
judges are relatively helpless to defend themselves from such attacks.
Nevertheless, in jurisdictions that require the election of judges, such
comment must be allowed.
Lawyers who are candidates for judicial office may not impugn the
integrity of the judicial system or question the decisions of the judge.
Lawyers may make fair comment on the judge's jilness so long as Iht'
comment does not call into question decisions of Ihe courl or question Ihc
integrity of the judicial s:vstem. For example, a lawyer may criticize a judge
for unnecessary delay in reaching a decision, but may not question the
decision itself except on appeal. This is not to say, however, that a lawyer
may not publicly disagree with a judge's decision. Proper avenues for
questioning a decision include the appellate route and disciplinary
proceedings where appropriate. What we condemn is conduct v,:hich
denigrates the judicial system as a whole and undennines the public's
confidence in it. S)

It can hardly be disputed that there is an important state interest in
maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice,84 Many cases
have relied upon that interest in holding that attorneys enjoy diminished free
speech rights when acting as advocates in the course of litigation,85 The

83. Id. at 704 (cita.i ns omitted) (emphasis added).
84. A state's interest in maintaining confidence in the.judiclal 5> stem is undoubtedly related to
its interest in maintaining confidence in the legal profession. In Florida Bar ,. Went/or li. Inc., 5 I 5 US
618 (1995), rules prohibiting personal injury lawyers from sending targeted di".t-maii solicitations to
victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident or disaster were upheld in part because the
Court found that the Bar had a substantial interest in prc ',enting the erosion of confidence in the kgal
profession that such invasions were found to have engendered. See Id. at 625-28. It is difficult to predict
what significance, if any, Went For it may have with regard to restrictions on speech incident to Judicial
campaigns. The rules at issue in Went for it were limitations on commerclQl speech by attorneys, which
is a fonn of expression that enjoys only diminished First Amendment protection. See Id. at 622. A
restriction on commercial speech that does not concern unlawful activity and is not misleading is
pennissible if the government: (I) asserts a substantial interest in support of its regulation: (2) establ ishcs
that the restriction directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) demonstrates that the regulation
is "narrowly drawn." fd. at 623-24 (citing Central Hudson Gas & EJec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980)). In contrast. speech incidental to judicial campaigns is poiltlcal speech, and
therefore entitled to a higher degree of constitutional protection. See Robert H. Bork, .\'eulral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47IND LJ. 1,29 (1971).
85. See Gentile V. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (holding that a state may limit out-ofcourt statements by attorneys about pending proceedings); Kentucky Bar Ass 'n v. Waller, 929 S W.2d 181,
183 (Ky, 1996) (suspending an attorney for stating in a motion that a judge was a "lying incompetent asshole"), cerl. denied, I 17 S. Ct. 949 (1997). In Waller, the court wrote:
Respondent appears to believe that truth or some concept akin to truth, such as accuracy or
correctness, is ,I defense to the charge against him. In this respect he has totally missed the
point. There can never be a justification for a lawyer to use such scurrilous language with
respect to a judge in pleadings or in open court. The reason is not that the judge is of such
delicate sensibilities as to be unable to withstand the comment, but rather that such language
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question, however, is whether the state interest in maintaining public
confidence in the courts is sufficient to restrict attorney speech outside the
courtroom when no litigation is pending and there is no serious risk of
prejudice to an ongoing proceeding. Some scholars answer that question in
the negative. For example, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky is of the view that
"[c]onfidence in government should never be gained by silencing speech"86
and that the speech rights of judges "only should be infringed if there is a
compellingjustification."87 As a general rule, restrictions on political speech
are upheld only in the most limited circumstances,88 such as where, under the
test in Brandenberg v. Ohio, the speech is "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite or produce such action."89
Aside from questions of constitutionality, the distinction proposed in
Riley-between speech which criticizes ajudge's actions or qualifications, on
the one hand, and speech which criticizes decisions of the judge and the
integrity of the judicial system, on the other hand 90-can be challenged on the
ground that it is unworkable in practice. Is it possible to impugn a judge's
actions or qualifications without adversely reflecting upon the judge's
decisions? Doesn't revelation of the fact that ajudge is incompetent, lazy, or
corrupt necessarily cast a dark shadow on the integrity of the judicial process?
It can be plausibly argued that the ruling in Riley renders the First Amendment
rights of judicial candidates illusory by providing that they can criticize a
sitting judge only if the statements about the judge do not undermine
confidence in the judicial system. 91
In Riley, the candidate in question (who was successful in winning a
judgeship) had criticized the incumbent judge by telling reporters that a
contempt order was "crazy," "absolutely insane," and "motivated by revenge
on the part of [the incumbent]," stating that the incumbent was "vindictive"
and "partial," and alleging that the "state simply doesn't get a fair trial in his
court."n The court found that these comments, and "particularly the statement
that '[t]he state simply doesn't get a fair trial in his court,' questioned the

promotes disrespect forth~ law and for the judicial system. Ot1lcers of the court are obi igated
to uphold the dignity of the Court of Justice and. at a minimum. this requires them to refrain
Irom conduct of the type at issue here.
Waller. 929 S.W.2d at 183. See generally WE Shipley. Annotation. AI/orne)"s Cntlclsm of JudlclOl Acts
as Ground of Disciplinary Action. 12 A.LR.3d 1408, 1418-27 (1967)
86. Erwin Chemerinsky. In Defense of Speech. Judges and fhe First Amendment, 4 The Long
Term View 78, 81 (1997)
87. fd. at 79.
88. See Bork, supra note 84, at 29 (stating that the "core of the first amendment" is "speech that
is explicitly political," which includes "criticisms of public officials and policies" and "speech addressed
to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country").
89. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
90. See In re Riley, 691 P2d 695, 704 (Ariz. 1984).
91. See id.
92. Id. at 703-04.
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decisions of the court and the administration of justice."93 The candidate's
actions, the court ruled, constituted "conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice,"94 and therefore discipline in the form of public censure was
imposed. 95 In dissent, the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court noted
the impracticality of the standard articulated by the majority, observing that
"[ 0 ]ften the only way the deficiencies or prejudices of a judge can be shown
is by referring to specific cases or categories of cases decided by that judge."96

Id at 704.
Id. Disciplinary Ruk 1·102(A)(5) of the Arizona ethics c\)dc prohibits an attorney from
engaging in "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.' Id. That same language \\as contained
93.
94.

in the old Texas Code of Professional Responsibility. TEX. STATE B.·\R R.. art. XII. ~ 8. (Tex Code prorl
Resp.). 34 TEX. BJ. 758 :1971. superseded 1990), which was replaced D: the current Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct on January l. 1990. See TEX. DISCIPLI'.;,\RY R. PROF'L CO'.;DLCT. r<'pnmed
,II TEX. GOV'T CODE AJ'..'N. tit. 2. subtit. G app. A (Vernon SUpp. 19lJ8) (TEX STATE B-\R R. art. X, 9 9):
Robert P. Schuwerk and John F. Sutton. Jr.. A GUide 10 the Texas DlsCipimary Rules of ProfessIOnal
Conduct. 27A HOL. L REv. 1.468 (1990) (discussing TEX. STATE BAR R. art. XII. ~8. DR 1·102(.·\)(5)
(Tex. Code Prof! Resp.), 34 TEX B.1. 758 (197!. superseded 1'!9U)) The Texas Rules do not carr:
forward the "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice' language. but instead have replaced it
with a ver:' different standard which prohibits attorneys from engaging in c(1nduet "constituting obstructiun
of justice.' The "obstruction of justice' standard is "substantially narrower' than the "prejudicial to the
administration of justiCe" rule. and it is doubtful that the language at issue in Riley could be found to
violate the new Texas formulation. "The drafters did not intend thi;, new standard to be triggered by
conduct significantly less egregious than that involved in the federal criminal offense of obstruction of
justice or its state counterparts.' Schuwerk & Sutton, supra at 475. It is therefore interesting to speculate
what provision of the Texas Rules or the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, if any, a Texas court could rely
upon if it were inclined to embrace a position similar to the one taken by the Arizona Supreme Court in
Riley. As noted above in the text, Canon 2(A) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a]
judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary" TEX. CODE JuD. CO:\Dl·CT. Canon 2(A). Canon 6(G)(3)
of the judicial code further provides that "[a]ny lawyer who is a candidate seeking judicial of1ice who
violates Canon 5 or other relevant provisions of this Code is subject to disciplinary action by the State Bar
ofTexas." Id, Canon 6(G)(3)
It seems reasonable that a judge who makes statements during a c:lm[laign impugning the integrit:
of the judicial system could be disciplined by the Commission on Judicial Conduct for violating Canon
2(A) and that a lawyer guilty of the same conduct could be disciplined by the State Bar because Canon
2(A) is an "other relevant provision.' \\ ithin the meaning of Canon 6( (i)(3) Of course. whether such
action would survive review under the First Amendment is presently unresolved.
95. See Riley, 691 P2d at 704-05. Interestingly, the court also CrIticized the candidate for having
publicly revealed that the incumbent judge had engaged in improper ex pane communication The c:oun
wrote:
Any grievance a lawyer may have concerning ethical misconduct b) a sitting judge should be
submitted to the Commission on JudiCial Qualifications. "Going [lublic' by a member of the
Bar is not the appropriate method to redress misconduct by a Judge. As the South Dakota
Supreme Court has noted: "That respondent sought instead to voice his complaints in precisel)
the manner and forum that would most likely cast doubt upon the competence and integrity of
the member of the judiciary without the slightest possibility that any constructive. remedial
actions would result from those remarks belies respondent's assertions that he made the
statement in good faith and in the spirit of constructive criticism."
Id. at 705 (quoting In re Lacey. 283 N.W.2d 250, 252 (SO. 1979))
96. Id at 709·10 (Holohan, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice further wrote:
If the court's opinion had limited itself to statements by the lawyer candidate which were false.
misleading. or concerning pending litigation. I could have joined in that portion of the opinion.
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In other contexts, similar notes have sounded. For example, in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals. Inc. v. Havner, "much of [a] ... motion for rehearing [was]
an intemperate attack on the members" of the Texas Supreme Court. 97 In
dissenting from an order of referral, Justice Rose Specter argued that the
writing could not possibly "form the basis for lawyer discipline," noting that:
[M]ore than fifty years ago Justice [Hugo] Black recognized (in the context
of a contempt proceeding for statements published in a newspaper) that
attempts to stifle criticism of judges and our courts may, in fact, be
counterproductive:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the
character of American public opinion. For it is a prized American
privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect
good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence,
however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of
the bench, would probably engender resentment. suspicion, and
contempt much more than it would enhance respect 98

The holding that a lawyer as a candidate for judge may not cnticize the decisions of a sitting
judge, however, is neither in hannony with the First Amendment nor with the necessities of a
free soc iety.
Judges are not unique in the realm ofpublic officeholders. The record books regretfully
show that some have been dishonest, incompetent, and prejudiced .. A ruling that a lawyer as
a candidate for the judiciary cannot bring such facts to the public notice, if such be the facts,
is a threat to our constitutional system.
Under the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, we must begin with the proposition
that "[I)ike other citizens. attorneys are entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment,
even as participants in the administration of justice." A rev iew of the cases in which attorneys
were disciplined for campaign comments directed at an incUlrhent judge strongly suggests that,
absent misrepresentation, courts should be most reluctant tll Impose discipline upon an attorney
for comments during ajudicial campaign except in egregious ~Ircumstances where a candidate
seriously denigrates the judicial system, impugns the reputation of an incumbent judge, or in
any way interferes with an ongoing proceedincc
Campaign criticism of an incumbent
judge's decisions, voting record. courtroom demeanor. or \\ork habits, however. should be
considered fair commen!.
While misstatement of fact by an attorney universally warrants sanction, the law is
equally clear that an attorney may criticize the legal decishJfls of a judge without sanction, so
long as these comments do not interfere with ongoing proceedings
The broad general statements in the majority opinion serve to stille honest and truthful
discussion about the decisions of a judge or court. As I read the majority opinion, a lawyer
may appeal a case. but the law'! er may never comment atter the case is tinally resolved that the
case made bad law, poor policy. or resulted in an injustice. Such a position is not only contrary
to the Constitution, but it also deprives the public of necessary information to make an
informed decision about the performance of their judges.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (~J 1982»
97. 956 S.W.2d 532. 532 (Specter, 1.. dissenting).
98. Id. (Specter, 1. dissenting) (citing Bridges v. California. 314 U.S 252,270·71 (1941»; see
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The constitutional uncertainty of restrictions on negative campaigning
strongly suggest that judges and judicial candidates must chart a cautious
course unless they wish to become embroiled in disciplinary proceedings.
Indeed, even if such limitations on political speech during the course of a
judicial campaign run afoul of the First Amendment, such statements should
be avoided, if for no other reason than that they place the speaker in a bad
light if there is a debate over the truth or falsity of the charges made by the
speaker. That is, the negativity or tastelessness of a statement made during a
judicial campaign may be taken into account by a fact finder in determining
whether the speaker acted with knowledge that the statement was false. or
with reckless disregard for the truth, and is therefore subject to discipline on
that independent ground.

D. Statements About Justiciable issues
For better or worse,99 the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits
judges and judicial candidates from expressing opinions "on any issue that
may be subject to judicial interpretation by the office \vhich is being sought
or held."loo This general rule is subject to a qualification which permits
discussion of a judge or candidate's "judicial philosophy," provided that
discussion would "not suggest to a reasonable person a probable decision on
any particular case."IOI The effect of these rules may be that judges are
protected from being forced to publicly commit to positions on issues they
have not fully considered and citizens are not compelled to litigate their
controversies before judges who have prejudged those matters. On the other

also Keith C. Livesay, Letter to the Editor, TEX. LAWYER. Dec. 8, 1997. at 36 ("If the justices expect
decorum and respect, they must not only accept the truth, they must ad in a manner which merits it by
writing intellectually honest and consistent opinions. ").
99. See Steven LubeL Judicial Conduct. Speech and Consequences, 4 Ine Long Term View 71
(1997) (arguing that judging generally benefits from privacy and that too much public speaking may
debase the process of judging, taking it out of the contemplative solitude of chambers and into the messy,
disputatious civic square).
100. TEX. CODE JUD. COC;Dl'CT. Canon 5( I) (emphasis added) Une occasionally hears surprising,
ifnot bizarre, reports ofa candidate for a civil court judgeship publlclv declaring to be in favor of the
death penalty, even though the court to which the candidate aspires has nothing to do with criminal cases
or the imposition of capital punishment Presumably, such conduct \\ould not violate Canon 5( I) since
the prohibition against the expression ofan opinion applies only if the opinion involves an "issue that may
be subject to judicial interpretation by the office which is being sought." Jd. Further, in such
circumsLances, the candidate's statements about the desirability of the death penalty might be regarded as
merely reflective of his or her judicial philosophy. and for that reason permissible under the exception to
the general rule discussed above in the text. Nevertheless. deliberate deception of electorate is a serious
matter. On appropriate facts, it might be argued that an attempt to curry support by misleading voters into
believing that the office in question has some power over the imposition of capital punishment is conduct
involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," and therefore punishable under Rule 8.04(a)(3)
of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L COC;DUCT
8.04(a)(3).
101. TEX CODE JUD. CONDVCT, Canon 5( I).
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hand, the effect may be that the public is relegated to vapid campaign rhetoric
and deprived of the information they would most like to have in order to cast
informed ballots. It would be possible to frame a rule narrower than the
current Texas provisions regulating discussion of judiciable issues that would
protect most, if not all, of the relevant interests. Such a rule might, for
example, prohibit a judge or judicial candidate from discussing issues in a
manner that would indicate a probable decision in any particular case.
However, that and other alternative paths have not been taken in Texas, and
the existing prohibition of issue discussion must be understood as broad.
"There is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a
judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction." 102
Some courts have found that language similar to that found in the Texas
code was so broadly drawn as to be unconstitutional. IO ) For example in
Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, the Seventh Circuit invalidated a
rule which provided that:
[A judge or judicial candidate] [s]hould not make pledges or promises of
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues
... ; provided, however, that he may announce his views on measures to
improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, if, in
doing so, he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any
issue that may come before him.l04

Finding the rule unconstitutional, Judge Richard Posner wrote for the court:
Two principles are in conflict and must, to the extent possible, be reconciled.
Candidates for public office should be free to express their views on all
matters of interest to the electorate. Judges should decide cases in
accordance with law rather than with any express or implied commitments
that they may have made to their campaign supporters or to others ...
[O]nly a fanatic would suppose that one of the princip~ 's should give way
completely to the other-that the principle of freedom of speech should be
held to entitle a candidate for judicial office to promise to vote for one side
or another in a particular case or class of cases or that the principle of
impartial legal justice should be held to prevent a candidate for such office
from furnishing any information or opinion to the electorate beyond his
name, rank, and serial number. ...
. . . [T]he concern which animates the rule is precisely that a candidate

102, Buckley y, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd" 997 F,2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993),
!O3, See j,C,J.D, v, RJ,C.R" 803 S,W,2d 953, 955 (Ky, 1991) (invalidating on constitutional
grounds a rule which barred judges and judicial candidates from announcing views on disputed legal or
political issues), But see Strenon v, Disciplinary Bd" 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3rd Cir, 1991) (upholding a rule
that was almost identical to the one at issue in Buckley, which is discussed below in the text),
104, 997 F,2d at 225,
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in a judicial election might, in order to attract votes or to rally his supporters,
make commitments to decide particular cases or types of case in a particular
way and having made such a commitment would be under pressure to honor
it if he won the election and such a case later came before him. This
commitment, this pressure, would hamper the judge's ability to make an
impartial decision and would undermine the credibility of his decision to the
losing litigant and to the community. The difficulty with crafting a rule to
prevent the making of such commitments is that a commitment can be
implicit as well as explicit. And this in two ways. The candidate might
make an explicit commitment to do something that was not, in so many
words, taking sides in a particular case or class of cases but would be so
understood by the electorate; he might for example promise always to give
paramount weight to public safety or to a woman's right of privacy. Or he
might discuss a particular case or class of cases in a way that was understood
as a commitment to rule in a particular way, even though he avoided the
language of pledges, promises, or commitments.
The rule here challenged deals with both forms of implied commitment
and in the most comprehensive fashion imaginable. The "pledges or
promises" clause is not limited to pledges or promises to rule a particular way
in particular cases or classes of case; all pledges and promises are forbidden
except a promise that the candidate will if elected faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of his judicial office. The "announce" clause is not
limited to declarations as to how the candidate intends to rule in particular
cases or classes of case; he may not "announce his views on disputed legal
or political issues," period. The rule certainly deals effectively with the
abuse that the draftsmen were concerned with; but in so doing it gags the
judicial candidate. He can say nothing in public about his judicial
philosophy; he cannot, for example, pledge himself to be a strict
constructionist, or for that matter a legal realist. He cannot promise a better
shake for indigent litigants or harried employers. He cannot criticize Roe v.
Wade. He cannot express his views about substantive due process, economic
rights. search and seizure, the war on drugs, the use of excessive force by
police, the conditions of the prisons, or products liability-or for that matter
about laissez-faire economics, race relations, the civil war in Yugoslavia, or
the proper direction of health-care reform. . .. A II these are disputed legal
or political issues.
The rule thus reaches far beyond speech that could reasonably be
interpreted as committing the candidate in a way that would compromise his
impartiality should he be successful in the election. Indeed, the only safe
response to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 67(B)( 1)(c) is silence ....
. . . [T]he principle of impartial justice under law is strong enough to
entitle government to restrict the freedom of speech of participants in the
judicial process, including candidates for judicial office, but not so strong as
to place that process completely outside the scope of the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech. Beyond that valuable generality the cases do
not provide much guidance, but they certainly do not support the proposition
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that to prevent the slightest danger of judicial candidates' making statements
that might be interpreted as commitments a state is free to circumscribe their
freedom of speech by a rule so sweeping that only complete silence would
comply with a literal, which is also so far as appears the intended and the
reasonable interpretation of the rule. 105

The constitutionality of the Texas rule has not been squarely addressed.
However, there is authority in Texas that it is impermissible for a judge or
judicial candidate to advertise or state a position on abortion. such as
declaring to be a pro-choice or pro-life candidate 106 Such conduct would
violate the rule on discussion of issues subject to judicial interpretation and
might also violate Canon 5(2)(1) because it carries a "strong impl ication of a
promise of particular conduct in office other than the faithful performance of
official duties."Io7
One recent San Antonio judicial campaign ad touted the candidate as
being "Tough-As-Nails. TOllgh-on-Crime."1~8 and another ad. for a different
judge, announced "Respect for the Victim. Tough Justice for the Criminal."J09
Such rhetoric is undoubtedly a consequence of America's never ending "war
on crime." Presumably, the proponents of such advertising take the position
that this kind of advertising is merely reflective of the candidate' s "judicial
philosophy" and would "not suggest to a reasonable person a probable
decision on any particular case."IIO That is a legitimate position. But it is also
a risky one. Judges and judicial candidates in other states have been
disciplined for making similar statements, such as "tough on drunk driving,"III
"solid reputation for law and order,"II2 and "does not allow plea bargaining."113
"The general sense of ... [those out of state] opinions is that anything that
could be interpreted as a pledge that the candidate will take a particular
approach in deciding cases or a particular class of cases is prohibited."'14
The severe limitations imposed in the discussion of justiciable issues
means that a judge or judicial candidate should exercise great care in
responding to a questionnaire submitted by a nrivate group seeking

105. id. at 227-31.
106. Comm. onJud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex .. Op. I~':\ I I C)'!)). repnnl<!d In 67 TEX ltD COL'c;CIL
& OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JL'D. SyS ",;". REP. 76 (1995)
107. id.
108. Ad on file with the Texas Tech Law Revie\\
109. Ad on file with the Texas Tech Law Revic\\
110. TEX. COD. JUD. CO';DLCT. Canon 5( I)
Ill. In re Kaiser, 759 P2d 392. 39.:\-96 (Wash 1988) (censuring an incumbent judge).
112. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 27. at 372 (citing in rc Nolan. a 198.:\ Unreported Order of the
Kentucky Commission on Judicial Conduct that censured a Kentucky judge for making improper remarks
and distributing improper campaign materials during a reelection campaign)
113. Id.
114. Id.
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information about the judge's views.1I5 It is permissible for the judge or
candidate to submit answers which communicate the judge's judicial
philosophy, but only if those answers do not represent an expression of
opinion on "any issue that may be subject to judicial interpretatio;; by the
office which is being sought or held"116 or, as discussed below, an opinion on
cases previously decided by a court on which the judge sat. lI7

E. True Information
As the discussion above may suggest, dissemination of the truth
generally enjoys a high degree of constitutional protection. Thus, it is
permissible for a judge who is running for judicial office to use the title
"judge" in political advertising and in the name of the campaign committee,
on campaign literature and stationery, in press releases. and in newspaper
articles. 118 Political literature may also accurately describe the judge's judicial
experience. I 19 This is true even if the judge is running for non-judicial
office. 120 Likewise, a judge or judicial candidate may accurately list in
political advertising the fact that he or she has been endorsed by special
interest groups, such as Texans Against Drunk Driving, Texans for Tort
Reform, Texas Prosecutors Association, Texas Peace Officers Association,
Texans for Law Enforcement, Pro-Life Texans, or Texans for Choice. 121 Even
though such groups may have strong political agendas, the mere listing of
their endorsement, by itself, does not violate the rule against expressing an
opinion on an area subject to judicial interpretation. 122
Of course, even accurate information may be presented in a way that is
misleading or otherwise objectionable. Thus, a judge may not use in his

115. See id. at 373. "Most advisory opinions addressing the use Df questionnaires in judicial
campaigns strongly disapprove of the practice." /d.
116. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5(1) (emphasis added)
117. See discussion irifra Part llLG.
118. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 164 (1993), reprinted in 65 TEX. JUD.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JGD. SYS. ANN. REp. 133 (l993) A difTerent rule applies when the
judge is running for a non-judicial political office. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar ofTex, Op. 159
(1993), reprinted in 65 TEX. JUD. COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. S1'5. ANN. REP. 131 (1993). The
use of the title "Judge" in that connection would violate the rule against lending the prestige of judicial
office to the advancement of private interest. See TEX. CODE JUD. CONDlCT. Canon 2(B). Thus, a sitting
judge cannot state in a political advertisement, "Elect Judge to Congress." See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State
Bar of Tex., Op. 159 (1993). In addition, a sitting judge who runs for a non-judicial political office cannot
use the title "Judge" in the name of the campaign committee. See id.
119. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 165 (1993), reprinted in TEX. JUD. COUNCIL
& OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEx. JUD. SYS. ANN. REp. 133 (1993)
120. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 159 (1993). "The judge must be cautious
not to give undue emphasis to his or her present uudicial] position so as to give the impression he or she
is attempting to exploit his or her judicial office." Id.
121. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 184 (l995), reprinted in 67 TEX. JUD.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. SyS. ANN. REp. 76 (1995).
122.

See id.
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campaign advertising confidential anonymous comments written by other
judges who attended a class that was taught by the judge. 123 To present those
comments as reflective of what other judges think about the judge as a
candidate running for office would "violate the trust in which they were
given," tend to mislead the reader because the judges who filled out the
evaluations mayor may not be supportive of the candidate. and indirectly lend
the prestige of judicial office to the advancement of private interests, in
violation of Canon 2(8).124

F. Comments About Pending and Impending Cases
A judge is prohibited from publicly discussing the merits of cases that
are, or may come. before the judge's court. 125 Similar restrictions apply to
statements by a judicial candidate. 12b The key provision is Canon 3(B)(l 0),
which provides:
A judge shall abstain from public commc:nt about a pending or impending
proceeding which may come before the judge's court in a manner which
suggests to a reasonable person the Judge' s probable decision on any
particular case. The judge shall require similar abstention on the part of
court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control. This section
does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of their
official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of
the court. This section does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is
a litigant in a personal capacity. 127

As drafted, the rule effectively distinguishes between statements about the
merits of a case, on the one hand, and mere procedural matters. on the other
hand. 128 The public discussion of procedural matters-such as whether jurors
will be sequestered or \vhether a losing party has a right to appeal-serves to
educate the citizenry about the operation of the legal system and poses little
or no risk to the adjudicatory process. Accordll1gly, there is no prohibition

123.

See Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex .. Op 168 (1994). reprinted In TEX. 1L.'D. COU",CIL

& OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. Jl·D. S YS. AN?-o:. REP. 125 ( 19Q.j)
124. Jd.

125. See TEX. CODE JeD CO:--:DlCT. Canon 3(B)( I 0)
126. See id.. Canon 5(3). This conclusion finds support in the language of Canon 5(3). which states
in relevant part that a "judicial candidate may. express his or her views on political matters in accord
with ... Canon 3(B)(I 0)." the canon which restricts statements by Judges about pending or impending
cases. Jd.
127. Id., Canon 3(B)(10). The last sentence of Canon 3(B)(10) is odd and perhaps unnecessary.
Cj id., Canon 3(8)( 1) (" A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which
disqualification is required or recusal is appropriate."). If the dispute was one in which the judge was a
litigant in a personal capacity. the judge would be disqualified from hearing the case. and therefore the
matter could not "come before the Judge's court." Id
128. See id. Canon 3(B)( 10)
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against such statements.
In contrast, comments about the merits of a case may jeopardize the
litigation process in any of several ways. Such statements may prematurely
commit the judge to a position before all evidence has been presented or they
may be animated more by a desire to please the public audience than by a
commitment to render an impartial decision. For these and other reasons,
statements about the merits of pending or impending cases, just like
expressions of opinion on other issues subject to judicial interpretation, are
broadly condemned. 129
Interestingly, the Code of Judicial Conduct expressly states that a lawyer
who contributes to a judge or judicial candidate's violation of Canon 3(B)( 10)
is subject to disciplinar~' action by the State Bar of Texas. 130 In so stating, the
judicial code is partially duplicative of a broader standard contained in Rule
8.04(a)(6) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which
provides that "A lawyer shall not ... knowingly assist a judge or judicial
officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct."131
However, the express reference to the impermissibility of a lawyer's aiding
ajudge or judicial candidate in a 3(B)( I 0) violation suggests that the drafters
regarded that provision as imposing a very serious obligation.
Even in the absence of a discussion about the merits of a case, a judge's
conduct may suggest how a case will be decided. In a Mississippi disciplinary
action, the facts showed that a judge had made a telephone call soliciting
political support from a person whom, unknown to the judge, was a litigant
in a case before him.m Because the contact raised the specter of influence
peddling, the judge was privately reprimanded. m

G. Comments About Past Cases
Judicial candidates in recent elections "have directi) :argeted [past]
judicial decisions as issues in the campaign."IJ4 For example:
During a 1994 Democratic primary race for the Texas Supreme Court one
challenger circulated a brochure picturing an abused woman and portrayed
the incumbent justice as a judge who voted for wrongdoers rather than
victims. The obvious implication was that if voters did not like the result in

129. See discussion of Canon 5( I) supra Part IlI.D.
130. See TEX. CODE JUD COSDL!CT. Canon 6(H). Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 6(H)
states in full: "An} lawyer who contributes to the violation of Canons 3B(7). 3B(10). 4D(4), 5 or 6C(2),
or other relevant provisions of this Code. is subject to disciplinary action by the State Bar of Texas." Id.
131. TEX. DISCIPLISARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.04(a)(6).
132. See In re Baker. 535 So. 2d 47. 48-49 (Miss 1988)
133. See id
134. Justice Craig Enoch. Foreward to Annual Survey afTexas Lall. 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 723,725
(1995)
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that case, they needed to elect the challenger in order to produce a different
result. 135
Are such statements ethically permissible because they deal with past
decisions rather than pending or impending cases? Similarly, maya judge
who dissented in a case discuss that controversy when running for re-election?
The judge may wish to illustrate his judicial philosophy by referring to the
dissent, or may desire to identify errors in the majority opinion which the
judge still believes require correction.
Statements of the sort described abc)\e may run afoul of Canon 3(B)( II),
which provides:
A judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose unrelated to judicial duties,
nonpublic information acquired in ajudicial capacity. The discussions. votes,
positions laken, and wrilings of appel/ule judges and courl persunnel about
causes are confidences of Ihe courl ulld shall be revealed ollly Ihrough a
courl 's judgment, a written opinion or Il1 uccurdcmce wilh Supreme Court
guidelines for a court approved histor~ project.l]b

Canon 3(B)( II) has been interpreted to mean that a judge on the Court of
Criminal Appeals or a justice on the Texas Supreme Court may not write a
newspaper opinion or editorial piece discussing his or her stated position on
a case that has been finally resolved by the court. IJ ?

H Discriminatory Bias or Prejudice
Today, overtly discriminatory statements rarely occur in American
political campaigns. Rather, when bias and prejudice are present, they
typically manifest themselves covertly through the use of code words or,
perhaps, carefully phrased rhetorical questions. While such forms of divisive
campaigning are not readily associated with judicial elections, it is easy to
recall widely publicized occasions when judges C''' the bench, in recent years,
have resorted to the use of demeaning language making clear their disdain for
members of minority groups,'38 such as homosexuals139 \Vhat if such

Jd.
TEX. CODE kD. CO:\Dl'CT, Canon 3(BII I I) (emphasis added)
137. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 191 (1996), reprm/ed In 67 TEX. JUD.
COUNCIL & OFF CT. AD"U:\. TEX. Jl'D. SyS. A~:\. REP. 78 (1995)
138. See, e.g., In re Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285, 286 (KY 1(85) (upholding a sanction against a
judge who used the phrase "nigger in the woodpile" in open court in a case with black defendants); In re
Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Wis. 1(89) (suspending ajudge for two years for, inter alia, intemperate
comments, including stereotypical remarks that stigmatiLcd black people).
139. See Favorable DeCiSIOn/or Judge Ignores Key Facts, DALLAS MORNI"G NEWS, Nov. 2, 1989,
at 30A, available in 1989 WL 6130219. The article discusses proceedings against ajudge who referred
to two slain men as" 'queers' who were looking for trouble by 'cruising for teen-agers.'" Id. The judge
135.
136.
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expressions of bias or prejudice creep into ajudicial race? Does the use of
such words or conduct, by itself, subject a judge or a judicial candidate to
discipline?
The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct does not expressly answer these
questions. In the courtroom or in the performance of other official duties, a
judge is obliged to observe a very high standard of conduct and to insist that
staff members and lawyers appearing before the judge conduct themselves
accordingly. Canon 3 provides in part that:
(6) A judge shall not, in the perfonnance of judicial duties. by words
or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not knowingly pennit
staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to
do so.
(7) A judge shall require lawyers in proceed ings before the court to
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status against parties, witnesses, counselor others. This
requirement does not preclude legitimate advocacy when any of these factors
is an issue in the proceeding. 140

Although these provisions are not by their terms applicable to statements
made during a judicial campaign, they undoubtedly set a standard toward
which candidates should aspire. Admittedly, the campaign trail is different
from the courtroom, and a greater range of expression may be defensible in
an electoral contest than during the course of formal litigation. However, the
provisions quoted above must be read in conjunction with relevant portions
of Canon 2(A). Tha: canon admonishes that a "judge ... should act at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary."141 Discriminatory words and conduct fly in the
face of this rule, for they suggest that the pr~sent or potential occupant of the
judicial post in question is unable or unwilling to act in an impartial manner.
In a recent South Dakota case, ajudicial candidate had made statements
asserting that there was "a collapse of rule of law" and implying that Native
Americans, blacks, farmers, women and other" 'powerless financially distressed nonvested' elements of society [were] not being treated fairly and
impartially by thejudiciary."J42 More specifically, the candidate accused the
incumbent "of giving 'the most severe of punishments' under the' cruel and

went on to say" 'I put gays and prostitutes at about the same leveL
somebody life for killing a prostitute.'" fd.
140.
141.

142.

TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(6)-(7).

/d.. Canon 2(A).
In re Hop"well, 507 N.W.2d 911, 912-14 (SO. 1993)

And], d be hard put to give
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deceptive guise of deterrence of crime' [to] 'juvenile Native American
offenders.' "143 The court found that those comments violated Canon 2(A),
which requires ajudge or judicial candidate to" 'conduct himself at all times
in a manner which promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.' ,,144 Based on those and other violations, the
attorney was suspended from practice. 145
Over the last two decades, much ink has been spilt over the issue of
whether judges may belong to clubs which exclude certain categories of
members, such as women, blacks, or Jews. In explaining the provision in the
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct \"hich now clearly condemns
"membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin,"146 the official comment
states:
[P]ublic manifestation by a judge of the judge's knowing approval of
invidious discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety
under Canon 2 and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Section 2AI47

It is likely that Texas disciplinary authorities would follow a similar analysis
with respect to improper discriminatory statements made in a judicial
campaign.

[ Statements By Others
Ajudge may not conveyor "permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge."148 Presumably, a judge
therefore has an affirmative duty to correct any such misstatements by others
that occur in the course of a campaign.
Interestingly, a lav'yer working on a judicia! campaign may also have a
duty to call upon the judge or judicial candidate to correct any misstatements
that he or she has made. Rule 8.04(a)(6) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct provides that "[a] lawyer shall not ... knowingly assist
ajudge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of

143. Jd. at 913.
144. Jd at 914.
145. See id. at918.
146. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C) (1990) The parallel provision in the Texas
Code of Judicial Conduct ditTers slightly. Canon 2(C) of the Texas code states: 'A judge shall not
knowingly hold membership in any organization that practices discrimination prohibited by law." TEX.
CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 2(C)
147. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C) em!. (1990)
148. TEX. CODE JuD. CONDUCT, Canon 2(B)
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judicial conduct or other !aw."149 It seems likely that mere knowledge of a
misstatement by the judge or the candidate will not be equated with knowing
assistance and will not trigger whatever remedial duties are inherent in the
rule, but involvement rising above "mere knowledge" may be treated
differently. Thus, a lawyer who distributes campaign literature \vhich is
known to contain a misrepresentation or who knowingly repeats incorrect
information obtained from the judge or judicial candidate runs a risk of
discipline.

IV.

SUPPORT FOR OTHER CAMPAIGNS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

A judge or judicial candidate can do very little to advance directly the
electoral chances of another candidate running for pub I ic office. ISO Canon
5(3) prohibits a judge from "authoriz[ing] the public use of his or her name
endorsing another candidate,"151 and Canon 2(8) prohibits a judge from
lending the prestige of judicial office to the advancement of private
interests. 152 These provisions have been construed in Texas to prohibit ajudge
or judicial candidate from verbally recommending another candidate or even
asking the voters to consider the candidate. ls3 Undoubtedly, more active
forms of endorsement will be found to run afoul of these precepts. In In re
Ovard, the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a

149. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDCCT 8.04(a)(6).
150. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 365 ("Although a non incumbent candidate has never
been found in violation of ethical standards regulating endorsements, a number of sitting judges have been
disciplined for participating in and supporting other persons' campaigns fcH Judicial office")
151. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT. Canon 5(3). Prior provisions of the Texas Code of Judicial
Conduct were construed to reach the same result. See Comm. on Jud Ethics. Slate Bar of Tex .. Op. 73
(1984), reprinted In 56 TEX. JUD. COL'NCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JLD Sys. ANN. REP. 85-86 (1984)
Finding that ajudge could not publicly endorse a candidate for public ollice. the corr.n,;,tee noted that "the
public endorsement of another person's candidacy, of necessity, involves the usc of the prestige of the
judge and the prestige of his office" and that "ajudge's invrlvement In another person's political race
places the judge in a partisan posture and gives the public cause to question the judge's independence."
Id.

The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct draws a distinction not found in the Texas code. The /\BA
code permits some limited forms of endorsement. Thus, Canon 5(/\)( I )1 b) states the general rule that" a
judge or a candidate for election or appointment to judicial office shall not
publ iell' endorse or publ iell'
oppose another candidate for public olliee." MODEL CODE OF JeDiCIAL CO~DL'CT Canon 5(/\)(I)(b)
(1990), but Canon 3(C)( I )(b)(iv) states the exception that a "judge or a candidate subject to publ ic election
may, except as prohibited by law ... when a candidate for election.. publiciy endorse or publicly oppose
other candidates for the same judicial office in a public election in which the Judge or judicial candidate
is running," Id. Canon 3(C)(I)(b)(iv).
152. See TEX. JUD. CODE CONDUCT, Canon 2(B).
153. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op. 170 (1994). reprrnted in 66 TEX. JUD.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. Sys. A1><N. REp. 126 (1994); see also in re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203,
234-36 (Mass. 1973) (discussing ajudge disbarred for numerous ethical infract'lons, including arranging
and attending political gatherings and serving as a toastmaster at a testimonial for another candidate); In
re Decker, 1994 WL 897478 at *4-5 (NY Com. Jud. Cond) (admonishing ajudge for publicly supporting
a county executive's campaign and for improper advertising in his own campaign)
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judge for endorsing, in several pieces of campaign literature, a candidate to
succeed himself as justice of the peace following the expiration of his term .15\
In one instance, the judge's endorsement \vas contained in the candidate's
paid political "valentine," in another it was part of the cand idate' s four-page
"Notice of False Endorsements," and in other instances the endorsement \vas
included in letters paid for by the candidate or the judge. 155 The Comm iss ion
found that this conduct constituted "willful and tlagrant" violations of the
provisions of Canon 7 .156
ll1ere is authority to similar effect in other jurisdictions. In other states,
authorities have held that it is improper for a Judge to aid a candidate by
sending out letters of support,157 hosting a barbeque,158 assisting in the
fonnulation of campaign strategies,159 purchas ing advertisements,160 or even
influencing a political party's choice of primary candidates 161
For essentially the same reasons, ajudge or judicial candidate may not
hand out campaign materials for another candidate or for a political party,
regardless of whether the materials are accompanied by a verbal endorsement
or whether an advertisement for the judge or judicial candidate appears in the
materials. 162 In addition, joint campaign activity by two judges is deemed to
be impennissible,161 such as mailing sample ballots which give the impression
that each judge endorses the other. 164 Thus, two or more judges runn ing for
judicial office at the same time may not jointly sponsor a fund raising event
or have a politically active group do that for them. 165
Care must also be exercised with respect to political contributions to
other campaigns. In general, a contribution is appropriate only "when the
judge is satisfied that neither the contribution nor the public record thereof
will receive public attention before the election."166 Presumably, this means
that the best course for a judge or judicial cand idate is to avoid making such

154. See Tex. Comm. on Jud. Conduct (Dec 27. 199~) (COP' on file With the Texas Tech Lnw
Review).
155. See id
156. See id
157. See OfTIce of Discipiinary Counsel v. Capers, 472:-'; 2d 1073. 1073-7.:1 (Ohio 1984)
158. See In re fvlartin. 434 S.E.2d 262, 263-64 (SC. 199]) iper curiam)
159. See In re DeFoor. 494 So. 2d 1121, 1121-23 (Flo. 1936) (per curiam)
160. See In re Stead), 641 A.2d 117, 119 (VI. 1994); .Harlln. 434 SE2d 3t262-64.
161. See In re Katie. 549 N.E.2d 1039, 1039-40 (lnd l 'NO) Iper curiam)
162. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex.. Op. 170 (1994). reprinted in 66 TEX Jl'D.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMI". TEX. JUD. SYS. ANN. REp. 126 (1994)
163. See id. (citing with approval Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex. Op. 100 (1987).
reprinted in 59 TEX JuD. COlC;CIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. SYS. A"N. REp 78 (1987))
164. See In re Pratt. 508 So. 2d 8. 9-10 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam); In re Kay, 508 So. 2d 329, 329-30
(Fla. 1987) (per curiam)
165. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 100 (1987).
166. Comm. on Jud. Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op. 145 (1992). reprinted In 65 TEX. Jl·D. COU.'iC1L
& OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JLD SYS. ANN REp 126 (1993).
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contributions. 167 In addition, a judge cannot display on the judge's vehicle a
bumper sticker supporting a political candidate. 168 The same rule also likely
applies to the erection of yard signs endorsing other cand idates. 169
Because a judge has an obligation to exercise proper supervision over
official staff members, ajudge must take reasonable steps tu ensure that staff
members do not engage in forms of political activity which would be
improper for the judge to engage in directlyYo Accordingly, there is authority
in Texas that states ajudge should not permit members of the judge's office
staff "to participate in pol itical activities such as pub lie Iy supporting a
candidate for election, acting as a campaign manager, and fund raising."I'1
U[S]uch political activity by a member of a judge's office staff would imply,
or would be likely to give the appearance of, the judge's support for the
candidate." m Likewise, authorities suggest, a staff member should not be
permitted to contribute money to another campaign unless such a contribution
by the judge would be appropriate. 17)
The Code of Judicial Conduct does not attempt to regulate the political
activities of a judge or judicial candidate's spouse.I'l Hmvever, if a judge's
spouse is a candidate for elective office, the judge faces many of the same
restrictions that ordinarily limit judicial involvement in the campaign of
unrelated persons. 175 The judge may attend political events relating to his or

167. See id. Whether similar restrictions apply in Texas to contributions made to a political party,
rather than to a specific candidate, is unclear. The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct contains language not found in the Texas Judicial Code of Conduct. The ABA code provides,
in relevant part:
(I) ajudge or a candidate subject to public election may, except as prohibited by la\\'
(a) at any time
(i) purchase tickets for and attend political gatherings.
(ii) idenlil himself or herself as a member of a political ran). and
(iii) contribute to a political organization ..
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990)
168. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 136 (199CJ). reprlmed In 62 TEX. JL'D
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. SYS ANN. REp. 125 (l't90)
169. See In re Martin, 434 S.E.2d 262, 262-64 (SC. 1993) (per curiam)
170. See TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT. Canon 3(C)(2) Canon 3(C)(2) provides "A judge shouid
require staff, court oftlcials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to observe the standards
of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the
performance of their official duties" Id. According to Canon 8(B)( II)
The rules prescribing that ajudge "require" certain conduct of others arc. like all of the rules
in this Code, rules of reason. The use of the term "require" in that context means ajudge is to
exercise reasonable direction and control over the conduct of those persons subject to the
judge's direction and control.
Id., Canon 8(B)(ll)
171. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 145 (1992).
172. Jd
173. See id.
174. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex., Op. 170 (1994), reprinted in 66 TEX. JUD.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN. TEX. JUD. Sys. ANN. REP. 126 (1994).
175. See In re Codispoti, 438 S.E.2d 549, 552-53 (W. Va. 1993) (censuring ajudge for improper
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her spouse's campaign, but may not speak at those events in support of the
spouse's campaign, for doing so would violate the rule against endorsements
and would lend the prestige of judicial office to the advancement of private
interests. 176 For sim i lar reasons, the judge may not allow the judge's name
and title to be used in press releases or campaign literature identifying the
candidate as the judge's spouse, and may not be introduced at the spouse's
campaign functions by name and title. 177 Presumably, similar restrictions
apply to a judge's involvement in the campaign of a closely related family
member other than a spouse. 178
A reasonable argument can be made that it is unethical for a judge to
induce his or her spouse to engage in the very activities that the judge is
prohibited from undertaking. 179 It is a basic principle of legal ethics that one
cannot do indirectly what one is prohibited from doing directly.180 Thus, Rule
8.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an
attorney not only from personally violating the ethics rules but also from
"do[ing] so through the acts ofanother."181 It would seem that, as a matter of
sound policy, the same rule should apply to judges. 182 In a decision suggestive
of this principle, a recent Indiana court reprimanded ajudge for purporting to
make an improper campaign contribution in the name of his spouse. IS) Of
course, the law has long abandoned the questionable fiction that the husband
and the wife are one; and therefore there should be a presumption that a
spouse has acted independently in undertaking any political activities in which
he or she has chosen to engage. Some cases have taken the principle against
indirect unethical conduct to considerable lengths. 184 In a New York
controversy, ajudge "was admonished for permitting a partnership in which
he had an interest to contribute to campaigns other than his own."185

involvement in his wite's judicial campaign and for misleading campaign advertisements); In re
McGregor, 614 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla 1993) (per curiam) (reprimanding a judge for actively participating
in his wife's campaign for county clerk of court).
176. See Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar of Tex .. Op. 180 (1995), reprin/ed In 67 TEX. Jt.:D.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMI~. TEX. JCD. SYS. ANN. KEP. 75 (1995)
177.
178.

See id.
See In re Turner. 573 So. 2d 1, 1-2 (Fla. 1990) (repflmanding ajudge for involvement in his

son's campaign for county judge)
179. See TEX. DISCIPLI;-;ARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 503(b)II), 804(a)( 1l.
180.

See id.

181. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'LCONDCCT 804(a)(I)
182. Such an approach. in many respects, would be consistent with the rule of judicial ethics which,
in the context of discussing administrative responsibilities, states that a "judge should require staff, court
officials and a/hers subjec//o /he judge's direc/ion and con/ro/to observe the standards of fidelity and
diligence that apply to the judge." TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(2).
183. See In re Sallee. 579 N.E.2d 75, 76-77 (Ind. 1991)
184. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 367 n.57 (discussing In re Devanl, an unreported 1985
Determination of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct)
185. Id.
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"A judge or judicial candidate ... may indicate support for a political
party."186 They may also attend political events and may express their views
on political matters. 187 These latter two actions are subject to the very
significant limitations imposed by Canon 5 and Canon 3(8)(10) with respect
to issues that may come before the judicial office sought or held, 188 pledges
or promises of conduct in office,189 and comments about pending or
impending proceedings. 190
One advisory ethics opinion has taken the position that judges may even
"support a county bond election, designated a 'Ia\\ and order election,' to fund
an expanded and improved jail facility, a new county criminal courts building.
and renovation and improvement of civil district and family courts
facilities."191 Perhaps this is not surprising since judges are permitted to
engage in activities to improve "the law, the legal system, [and] the
administration of justice"192 and because, strictly speaking, on the posited
scenario, the judges would not be lending "the prestige of judicial office to
advance the private interests of the judge or others."I~J However, judicial
involvement with other types of ballot issues may be improper, particularly
where the actions "cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capac itl' to act
impartially as ajudge"194 or amount to an expression of opinion on any issue
that may be subject to judicial interpretation. 195 Accordingly, a judge may not
"actively support a bond election to raise funds to develop a city water
project."I96
V. USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES
Because a judge may not lend the prestige of judicial office to the
advancement of private interests, "judicial letterhead" may not be used to
solicit contributions or other support for the judge' 5 campaign. 197 "Of course
a judge's campaign literature should state the judge's nresent title and
position. but the use of official judicial letterhead for campaign purposes

186
187.
188
189
190.
191.
& OFF, CT,
192,
193.
194,

TEX CODE JCD. CO~DL:CT. Canon 5(3).
See id.
See discussion supra Pan llLD.
See TEX. CODE JL'D. CO>:DL'CT. Canon 5(2)(1)
See discussion supra Pan !lIT
Comm, on Jud. Ethics. State Bar ofTex,. Op. 82 (1986), repnnti!d
ADMIN. TEX. JCD. S1'S. A>:N. REp, 80 (1986)
TEX. CODE JLiD, CO~DCCT, Canon 4(B),
fd.. Canon 2(B) (emphasis added),
/d. Canon 4(A)(I)

In

58 TEX JL:D. COl~CIL

195. See id" Canon 5(1),
196. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, State Bar ofTex" Op, 82 (1986)
197. See Comm. on Jud, Ethics. State Bar of Tex., Op, IJ7 (1990), reprinted In 63 TEX. JL'D.
COUNCIL & OFF. CT. ADMIN, TEX. JUD. S1's. A!'iN. REp, 120 (1991) "Judicial letterhead [is] letterhead that
shows ajudge's title, position. and official address and is suitable for official judicial correspondence"
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could give the appearance that a judge-candidate is attempting to exploit the
judge'sjudicial position."I98
One result of this limitation on the use of judicial letterhead is that, in
some parts of the state, campaign literature has taken on a markedly
lighthearted look. Far from the heavyhanded appearance of governmental
stationery, fundraising communications for judicial candidates often resemble
festive party invitations. One recent mailing in San Antonio, which was not
atypical, involved a large postcard that, amidst a coil of rope and a scattering
of stars, depicted a mustachioed character with a cowboy hat, shotgun, and
star on his chest. 199 The image perhaps looked more like the to\vn sheriff than
even a frontier judge-\vhich may have been an attempt to convey a subtle
message on law and order. The text on the invitation cheerfully invited the
recipient to a fundraiser, stating "Join the Round Up to Keep Judge
in
the Saddle."20o In terms of suggested donations, it read: "Covipokes $50,
Wrangler Hosts $500, Traildriver Sponsor $250, Lil' Cowpokes free.''201 In
addition to music, the event offered "vittles" and entertainment in the form of
"Shootin' by the South Texas Gunfighters.":'" Another imitation, from a
different judge, had a picture ofa team mascot (a dragon) on the front cover,
then invited the recipient to hockey game, complete with a reception and a
silent auction offering the chance to bid on a weekend in Las Vegas,
autographed team souvenirs, and a "Steer (Dead or Alive)."20) A pair of
tickets to the game were enclosed "complements of' the judge. 2M A fastidious
ethicist might argue that such insouciant campaign literature is undignified
and therefore runs afoul to the duties under Canons 1 and 2 to promote the
integrity of the judiciary.20s But it is hard to imagine that such advertising
does any real harm to the public image of the judiciary. What is wrong with
thinking that ajudge has a sense of humor, can enjoy a good time when away
from the bench, and likes music, good food, or sports?
The prohibition against improper use of public resources encompasses
much more than judicial stationery. Thus, ajudge who improperly uses office

198.

Id.

199.

Ad on file with the Texas Tech Law Revie\\

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
Id.
id
id.
id.

TEX. CODE JCD. CO~D\JCT, Canon I Canon I provides
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society A judge
should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and
should personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary is preserved. The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further
that objective.
Id. Canon 2(A) states· A judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Id., Canon 2(A).

848

TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29:811

facilities and employees for political purposes may be found to violate the
canon requiring a judge to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary or other standards. 206 In In re
Devine, the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a
judge for using his chambers for a gathering of supporters to announce his
intention to run for Congress. 207 "The judge's chambers, an area designated
for the judge's benefit in the furtherance of his judicial duties, is not to be
used as a forum for the judge's personal pursuit of public office."208 The
Commission found that the holding of the political gathering was a wilful
violation of Canon 2(B), which prohibits lending the prestige of judicial office
to the advancement of private interests. 209
VI.

CONCLUSIO~

A candidate for judicial office faces a daunting array of obstacles. First,
he or she must identifY a race which, because of the existence of a vacancy or
the weakness of the incumbent, it is possible to \vin. Then, the candidate must
rally supporters, raise contributions, comply with financial disclosure
requirements, attract favorable attention, achieve name recognition, and cajole
potential voters at what often seems to be an endless array of public events.
Finally, the candidate must persuade the electorate to tum out at the polls and
to mark the right box or pull the right lever in numbers sufficient to surpass
all opponents. To add to this host of obstacles a tangle of ethical restrictions,
which limit what the candidate may say on his or her own behalf or what types
of support others may provide, might strike some as unfair. 2IO But that is the
American way, and, in general, the system works. The tradition of the
American judiciary, on the whole, has been one of honor, integrity, hard work,
and fairness. 'he ethics rules that preclude judges and judicial candidates
from engaging in inappropriate political activity make an important
contribution to continuing that tradition and, througn it, to advancing the
administration of justice. The ethcal limitations applicable to political
campaigns, perhaps more than ever, need to be followed and enforced with the
same passion that accompanies other aspects of the political process. If they

206. See In re Conda. 370 A.2d 16. 19-20 (Nl. 1977) Th~ "promote contidence" obligation is
embodied in Canon 2(A) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
207. Tex. Comm on Jud. Conduct (Mar. 25.1997) (copy on tile with the Texas Tech Law Review).
Effective January I. 1999, a recent amendment to Canon 5(4) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
provides in part:
A judge shall resign from judicial office upon becoming a candidate in a contested
election for a non-judicial office either in a primary or in a general or in a special
election.
Adoption of Amendments to the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, 61 Tex. B.1. 63 (1998).
208. Tex. Comm. on Jud. Conduct (Mar. 25,1997) (copy on !lie with the Texas Tech Law Review).
209.
210.

See id.
See TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canons 5, 2.

1998]

ETHICAL CAMPAIGNING FOR THE JUDICICARY

849

are, the judiciary will take an important step toward weathering the current
storm of judicial criticism that recently has attracted so much attention and
threatened public confidence in the courts.

